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July, 1954
STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
FRED S. KAWANO*
LABOR LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
The scope of governmental intervention in the field of labor-
management relations mirrors the increase in government appar-
ent in other fields of economic and social endeavor. Due to the
complexities resultant upon the transition to high industrializa-
tion, the early philosophy based on the doctrine of laissez faire
has, by necessity, given way to one of increased governmental ac-
tivity.
The advent of the participation of government in industrial
affairs has produced problems not only economic in nature, but
legal and constitutional as well. Under the 10th Amendment to
the Constitution, the Federal Government is said to possess only
delegated powers, while the States are said to be custodians of
residual powers. This dual system of government has made it
rather difficult to deal with many modern social and economic
problems, including labor problems and labor legislation; often
the Supreme Court has been obliged to decide whether or not each
of the political divisions is acting within the sphere established for
it by the Constitution of the United States.
Police power, defined by many authors as a power inherent
in government to protect itself and all of its constituents,' is the
basis upon which the states have passed most of their laws deal-
ing with labor, health, safety, morals, and general well-being of
the people. However, the exercise of police power has created
jurisdictional conflicts between the Federal and State Govern-
ments. This often occurs when the state attempts to legislate and
solve labor problems in the same field in which the Federal Gov-
ernment, acting under and by virtue of the Commerce Clause, also
has legislated and claimed jurisdiction.
The Federal Government derives its jurisdictional power pri-
marily from the Commerce Clause and secondarily, from the
"Necessary and Proper Claudse.'"2 When interstate commerce is
involved, and the Federal Government has constitutional jurisdic-
tion, the problem of the area of state jurisdiction is manifest.
Early in our constitutional history, it was decided that the Com-
merce Clause, standing alone, does not bar state regulation of
activities of a predominately local concern, where nationwide uni-
formity of regulation is not imperative, even though the activities
involve or affect interstate commerce. 3 At the same time, how-
*Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
IPrentice-Hall, Labor Course (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 1039.
^U. S. CONST., Art. I, §8 (3) and (18).
'Houston v. Moore, 1820, 5 Wheat. 1, pp. 20-23.
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ever, it was decided that the affirmative grant of power to regulate
commerce, coupled with the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, enabled Congress to close the door completely
to state regulation even in these areas.4 It followed, therefore,
that the scope of state regulation, in areas in which Congress could
regulate, was subject to the will of Congress.
Congress, of course, may specifically state that state regula-
tion shall be paramount to Federal law.5 Where Congress has
clearly manifested its intention either to premit or to preclude
state jurisdiction, nothing remains for the courts but to give
effect to Congressional judgment. Courts have assumed that the
remaining area was open to state regulation where Congress man-
ifested no intention with respect to the survival of state regula-
tory powers and where there was no evidence that Congress had
even considered the problem.,
But, if Congress intended comprehensively to treat (whether
by regulating or by leaving free from regulation) a particular
subject, i.e., if it intended to "occupy the field", the states are de-
prived of jurisdiction. "The laws of the United States . . .shall
be the Supreme Law of the Land". [The Constitution of the United
States, Article VI, (2)]. The task of the court is not that of de-
termining whether or not state law applies 7 but rather to de-
termine the scope of the "field" which Congress intended to be
occupied. Specific legislation was thought of by Congress as com-
prehensive treatment of some segment of human activity; within
that segment or field, matters, not expressly dealt with, are deemed
to have been deliberately placed outside the bounds of regulation
and the states may not interfere with the Congressional scheme
by regulating these activities. The delineation of the "occupied"
field necessarily rests on the attitude of the court and the public
with respect to federal authority generally, and the relative merits
of the federal and state labor laws.8
NLRA AND THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Twenty-five years ago, there was no general federal labor
law. Today, the National Labor Relations Act is virtually a com-
plete code of labor legislation. Both the Wagner Act of 1935, the
original NLRA, and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments thereto
(known as the Labor Management Relations Act) empowered the
National Labor Relations Board to act "whenever a question af-
fecting commerce" arises concerning representation of employees.
The Board may investigate such controversy and certify . . . the
representatives that have been designated ;9 it is "empowered .. .
'U. S. CONST., Art. VI (2); and Art. I, § 8 (18).
NLRA, Section 14 (b); Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relation Board, 336 U. S. 301, 49 A. L. C. 239 (1949).
6 Charleston, E. Carolina R. R. v. Varnville Co., 237 U. S. 297, p. 604; Mis-
souri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341, pp. 345-346 (1926).
Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Porter, Ibid.
Prentice-Hall, Labor Course, p. 4168.
9 LMRA AND NLRA, §9 (c); I. A., 29 U. S. C., §141 (b).
July, 1954256 DICTA
July, 1954
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice . . .affecting commerce".' 0
The term "commerce," the basis of NLRB jurisdiction is de-
fined as "trade, traffic commerce, transportation, or communica-
tion among the several states or between the District of Columbia
or any foreign country,"" and the related term "affecting com-
merce" means "in commerce or bordering or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce or having led or tending to
lead to a labor dispute bordering or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce."'
12
The Wagner Act contains no provision relating to the juris-
diction of state boards or concerning the delegation of jurisdic-
tion to them by the NLRB. Although language relating to "ex-
clusive jurisdiction" appears in Section 10 (c), a prohibition of
action by state boards was not intended. Congress, by this lan-
guage, intended to exhaust its powers under the Constitution
and extend coverage of the law to the fullest extent legally per-
missable.13 In any event, all businesses, however small and how-
ever "local" in character, could be made subject to the law, except
in de minimus situations.
14
Even though the potential jurisdiction of the Board was ex-
tensive, it was neither practical nor wise for it to expand its cov-
erage any more than was absolutely necessary. Since every busi-
ness has a situs within a state, local authorities have a vital in-
terest in labor relations of a business, physically present therein.
These practical considerations led the old Board to decline juris-
diction over many businesses which were usually regarded as
"local" in character except where the business was an integral
part of a company engaged in interstate commerce; a local branch
or a subsidiary corporation,'5 or a business servicing one engaged in
interstate commerce. 16 Since the state boards, during this era,
quite frequently exercised jurisdiction over "local" businesses and
even asserted jurisdiction admittedly in interstate commerce where
the NLRB did not act for budgetary or other reasons, this policy
of NLRB was calculated to promote maximum labor peace.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made two changes in Section
10 (a) of the Wagner Act: It eliminated the reference to "ex-
clusive" jurisdiction and providing for delegation to state boards,
under certain conditions. Section 10 (a) of the NLRA provides
as follows:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce. This
"LMRA AND NLRA, §10 (a).
,LMRA AND NLRA, §1 (6); and LMRA, §503 (3).
,NLRA AND LMRA, §1 (7); and LMRA, §501 (1).
,' Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643.
'4 NLRB v. Fairblatt, 306 U. S. 601.
Atlantic Co. v. NLRB, 65 NLRB 1274.
"Trinidad Brick and Tile Co., 67 NLRB 1351.
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power shall not be affected by any other means of ad-
justment or prevention that has been or may be estab-
lished by agreement, law or otherwise: provided, that the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of
any State or Territory to cede to such agency, jurisdic-
tion over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications, and transportation, ex-
cept wherein predominantly local in character) even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting
commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial
statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provi-
sion of this act or has received a construction, inconsistent
therewith.'
7
The T-H Act also expressly sanctions state legislation which im-
poses greater restrictions on union shop and other forms of union
security than are provided by the federal act,'8 and exemplifies
the basic principle that Congress may specifically provide that
state regulation shall be paramount to Federal law.'9
Although the language of the Wagner Act, relating to "com-
merce" and "affecting commerce", was unchanged, certain funda-
mental changes in the structure and purposes of the federal labor
relations law made it inevitable that the Board would expand its
operations. Membership was increased from three to five and five
panels of three members each were set up.20 The budget of the Board
was also increased. New procedures were introduced, and addi-
tional Unfair Labor Practices (ULP's) were designated. How-
ever, the Board did not feel compelled to extend its coverage to
include all businesses which might technically be subject to juris-
diction and continued to decline jurisdiction over local businesses
where the exercise of its jurisdiction would not, in its view,
"effectuate the purposes of the act".
In 1950, the Board announced that, because of its heavy load
and limited budget, it would, in the future, take jurisdiction only
over those businesses in which a labor dispute would have a
"pronounced impact upon the flow of commerce".-' Subsequently,
in eight simultaneous decisions, the board set forth the "yard-
sticks" by which it intended to measure this impact. The Board
said it would take jurisdiction over the following types of busi-
nesses:
1. Instrumentalities and channels of interstate and foreign
commerce
2. Public utility and transit systems
17 NLRA, §10 (a).
18LMRA, §14 (b).
"Ibid.
'LMRA, §3 (a) (b).
2 Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 635; National Gas Co., 99 NLRB 273;
and Brooks Wood Products, LABOR LAW REVIEW, 13004.
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3. Integral parts of multi-state enterprises
4. Enterprises, annually shipping $25,000 worth of goods out
of state
5. Enterprises, annually supplying $50,000 worth of services
or materials to interstate enterprises
6. Enterprises, annually purchasing $500,000 worth of mater-
ials from out of state
7. Enterprises, spending $1,000,000 on purchases from local
suppliers of interstate materials
8. Enterprises, whose total purchases and sales, expressed in
percentages of the minimum requirements, equal 100%
9. Establishments, substantially affecting national defense
-2 2
This list is subject to additions or deletions, or even alterations of
the existing tests, at any time. The Board may find it desirable
to make such changes because of changes in its budget or case
load, or for policy reasons. Also, the Board's "yardsticks" are so
comprehensive, when construed broadly, persons or industries
that seemingly would be considered predominantly local in char-
acter, 23 also would seem to be included.
When an employer or union questions the jurisdiction of the
Board, claiming that the business is essentially local in character,
the Board decides the question in a case by case basis. All the
petitioner can do is to file his petition and wait, often for many
months, to learn whether the Board will exercise jurisdiction.
Where the Board has construed Section 10 (a) of the Act narrowly
state boards have been deprived of jurisdiction, not only of inter-
state business where the NLRB has failed or refused to act, but
also that which is intrastate in nature. Thus, this creates a "no
man's land" in the field of local business. In addition, although
deprived of access to the NLRB, small or local businesses will
continue to be subject to the civil, equitable, and criminal pro-
visions of the act, if the business "affects commerce".2
4
In other cases, NLRB has allowed the state to remain free to
punish, on traditional non-labor relations grounds, acts of violence
and coercion by individual employees, who, unless acting as
agents of a union, are immune to the ban imposed by Section 8 (b)
1-A of the Act. The NLRB has also stated that although an em-
ployee's assault upon a union organizer may amount to "interfer-
ence" within the prohibition of Section 8(a) (1) of the National
Act, the states retain jurisdiction to punish such an assault as a
police court matter.25 Since the National Act pre-empts only the
field of labor relations law and policy, the states are not precluded
from applying ',) unions, employers and employees the same legal
and policy standards which are applicable to all citizens generally.
Prentice-Hall, Labor Course, p. 4028.
Breeding Transfer Co., 95 NLRB 1157; Prentice-Hall, op. cit., p. 4031.
1E. L. Schwartz, A No Man's Land in Labor Relations, LABOR LAW JOURNAL
(Chicago, Ill.: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1949-50), Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 189.
2Arlon Studios, 74 NLRB 1158; Spalik Engineering Co., 45 NLRB 1272;
Revlon Products Corp., 48 NLRB 1202; Paragon Die Casting Co., 27 NLRB 878
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CASES INVOLVING STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Supreme Court Decisions
Union Security: Although union shop agreements are per-
mitted under federal law, the NLRA does not authorize any union
security agreements where state law prohibits or regulates them.2 6
In Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, (op. cit. supra), the NLRB certified local
1521 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners as
bargaining representatives for the production employees of Al-
goma Plywood and Veneer Co., a Wisconsin company, whose ac-
tivities affected interstate commerce. Moreau, an employee of
Algoma, filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
unfair labor practice charges arising out of his discharge. The
Wisconsin Board agreed with Moreau and held that the mainten-
ance of a membership agreement between the company and the
union was invalid because it was not preceded by the authorization
elective required by the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. It
ordered Algoma to reinstate Moreau with back pay. The union
and employer brought the case first to the Wisconsin Courts and
thereafter to the United States Supreme Court on the theory that
the Wisconsin Board had no power to act; that since a maintenance
of membership agreement was lawful under the NLRA, and the
State law to the contrary should not govern. The plaintiffs relied
on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, but the United States
Supreme Court disagreed. There was no doubt, the Court con-
ceded, that Algoma was subject to the NLRA, but this fact did not
mean that Algoma was exclusively subject to the NLRA. The
Company would be exclusively subject to the NLRA only if that
act expressly or implicitly revealed a Congressional intention to
pre-empt either the whole field of labor relations law or, at least,
compulsory unionism. Legislative history and the Act, said the
Court, clearly indicated an intent not to interfere with state laws
relating to compulsory unionism. Accordingly, Algoma was under
a duty to observe the requirements of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act. The state board had jurisdiction to find that Algoma
had committed an unfair labor practice and remedy it.
In the Plankington case,'2 7 the NLRB certified the United
Packing House Workers of America (CIO) as exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the Plankington Packing Co., an interstate
business. In February, 1945, pursuant to directive of the NLRB,
the union and the company executed a maintenance of member-
ship agreement. Stokes, an employee, attempted to resign from
the union, but the union did not accept the resignation. Once
again, after a finding by the Wisconsin Board, similar to the one
in the Algoma case, the state and federal judicial circuit was
travelled. On appeal from the State ruling, a Wisconsin Circuit
-NLRA, §14 (b).
- WERB v. Plankington Packing Co., 16 Labor Cases. 64,910 (1948).
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Court held that the State Board acted beyond its power. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court and, relying on
the Algoma case, held that there was room for the Wisconsin act to
apply, notwithstanding the fact that the company involved was
subject to the NLRA. This time, however, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Court in a per curiarn
decision. Since the Wisconsin Board had ordered Plankington to
reinstate Stokes with back pay, the Supreme Court reversal required
Plankington to do neither. In the Algoma case the sole issue was
that of the maintenance of a membership agreement. In the
Plankington case the legality of the discharge of employee Stokes
in no way rested on the legality of the maintenance of membership
agreement once he had tendered his resignation to the union with-
in the "escape period". Accordingly, the agreement simply was
not applicable to Stokes. The decision could have been based only
on one other provision of the Wisconsin Act which declared it to
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization by discrimination
in hire, tenure, terms or conditons of employment. When the
provision is applied, conflict between the National Act and the State
Act becomes apparent. The National Act contains an "employer-
discrimination" provision virtually identical to that of the State
Act.2 8 Where there is a possibility of conflict existing, the basic
principle of "occupation of the field" operates to deprive the state
of jurisdiction. Section 10 (a) of the NLRA clearly discloses that
the NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, defined in
Section 8 of the NLRB, was meant to be exclusive.
2 9
Representation Cases: In the Bethlehem Steel case20 the
NLRB had refused to certify a union as a collective bargaining
agent for supervisors. The New York Board entertained a repre-
sentative petition filed by foremen employed by a company en-
gaged in interstate commerce. In a suit instituted by the em-
ployer challenging the New York Board's assumption of juris-
diction, the Supreme Court held that the New York Board had
no power to act. The essential fact, according to the Supreme
Court, was that both the Federal and State governments had at-
tempted to govern an identical phase of employer-employee re-
lationship and had delegated, to their respective agencies, a discre-
tion which could result in conflicting decisions. In an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Holmes the court stated: "When Congress
has taken the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is
as ineffective as opposition . . .If the two Boards attempt to exer-
cise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the appropriate unit of
representation, action by one, necessarily denies the discretion of
the other. The State argued for the rule that would enable it to
'NLRA, §8 (a) 3.
'A. K. Garfindel, Conflict Between Federal and State Jurisdiction, LABOR
LAW JOURNAL (1949-50), Vol. 1, No. 13, pp. 1027-1044.
0Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYLRB, 330 U. S. 767, 67 S. Ct. 1026.
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act until the Federal Board had acted in the same case. But we do
not think that a case by case test of federal supremacy is per-
missible here. The Federal Board has jurisdiction of the industry
in which these particular employers are engaged and has asserted
control of their labor relations in general. 31 It asserts its power
to decide whether these foremen may constitute themselves a bar-
gaining unit. We do not believe this leaves room for the operation
of the state authority asserted."
In another representative proceeding,3 2 the Supreme Court
invalidated a certification granted by the Wisconsin State Board
to the Telephone Guild, an independent union. The Guild had
filed a petition with the NLRB while negotiations were pending
between the company and the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, AFL, for renegotiation of a contract. The Guild
withdrew its petition before the NLRB had acted upon it and filed
with the State Board. The State Act and the Wagner Act differed
in the procedure to be followed in determining the bargaining
unit. Considering the differences, the Court stated: "The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court concluded that the Wisconsin Board could ex-
ercise jurisdiction here until and unless the National Board under-
took to determine the appropriate bargaining representatives or
unit of representation of these employees . . . In the Bethlehem
Steel Case, on p. 776, we rejected that argument, saying, 'The
State argues for a rule that enables it to act until the Federal
Board has acted in the same case. But we do not think that a case
by case test of federal supremacy is permissible here.' We went
on to point out that the National Board had jurisdiction of the in-
dustry in which the particular employers were engaged and as-
serted control of their labor relations in general. Both the State
and Federal statutes had laid hold of the same relationship and
had provided different standards of regulation. Since the em-
ployers in question were subject to regulation by the National
Board, we thought the situation too fraught with potential con-
flict to permit the intrusion of the State agency, even though the
Board had not acted in the particular cases before us."
The Bethlehem and La Crosse cases appear to stand for
the proposition that once the NLRB assumes jurisdiction in
an industry, the jurisdiction becomes exclusive. Although the
La Crosse case involved inconsistent regulation, the language
in the opinion made it clear that even consistent regulation would
be prohibited under the Wagner Act.
Despite the exclusive character of jurisdiction, there are cer-
tain aspects of interstate labor relations subject to state regula-
31 See, J. L. Walsh, Local Business, LAUOR LAW JOURNAL (1949-50), Vol. 1,
No. 10, pp. 783-788, 828, for industries in which the NLRB has asserted juris-
diction (footnote added).
La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U. S. 18.
DICTA
July, 1954
tion; local regulation is permitted when it is determined that no
intent to pre-empt is disclosed.
33
Concerted Activities and Unfair Labor Practices: In the
Allen Bradley case, 34 employees of the company engaged in inter-
state commerce, struck and engaged in mass picketing of homes
of other employees and also threatened violence to non-strikers.
Such activities were considered unfair labor practices under Wis-
consin law. The State Board accordingly issued a cease and de-
sist order. The Supreme Court upheld the state action, holding
that Congress had not made such employee-union conduct subject
to regulation by the Federal Board. It should be remembered that
union practices were not tested as "unfair" until the passage of
the Taft-Hartley amendments.
In the Briggs and Stratton case,35 the union, during contract
negotiations, called frequent unannounced meetings during work-
ing hours in order to pressure the company. The local board or-
dered the union to cease and desist, and in a five to four decision
the United States Supreme Court upheld the state action. The
majority stated: "There is no existing or possible conflict or over-
lapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, be-
cause the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate,
approve or forbid the union conduct in question. Although "What
Congress has given, the state may not take away", Congress, in
Section 7 of the NLRA, had not given protection to intermittent
work stoppages.
A later case 36 involved the validity of a Michigan statute re-
quiring a strike notice to the State Mediation Board, a waiting
period, and a majority strike vote. The Supreme Court unanimously
held the state law unconstitutional and reasoned, "None of these
sections (NLRA, Section 7, 8 (b) (4) and Section 8 (d) and Sec-
tion 13) can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of
peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field
and closed it to state regulation." The Briggs and Stratton case
was distinguished as involving an activity which the Court re-
garded as "coercive", similar to the sit-down strike or labor vio-
lence and thus subject to state police power.
Later a Wisconsin statute, providing for compulsory arbitra-
tion and prohibiting strikes in public utilities, was held unconstitu-
tional.3 7 The decision was based on the theory that jurisdiction,
once assumed is exclusive, and the states thereby are precluded
from regulating.
38
I International Union Local 232 v. WERB (Slowdown could be restrained
by State Board), 69 S. Ct. 516 (1949); Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB,
Ibid.
Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. WERB, 315 U. S. 745 (1942).
International Union, UAW v. WERB, 336 U. S. 245, 49 A.L.C 177 (1949).
International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 50 A.L.C. 436 (1950).
"Amalgamated Association of Railway Employees v. WERB, 340 U. S. 381,
51 A.L.C. 201 (1951).




The trend toward federal jurisdiction over unfair practices
was supplemented in a recent decision.3 9 Trucking business oper-
ators sought to enjoin picketing on the ground that its purpose
was to coerce operators into violating the state statute forbidding
an employer to encourage or discourage membership in labor or-
ganizations by discrimination in hiring, tenure of employment,
or any condition of employment. The Court of Common Pleas
of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, entered a decree restraining
picketing and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the decree and dismissed the bill for want
of jurisdiction and the operators brought certiorari. The United
States Supreme Court held that the operators' complaint fell with-
in the NLRB's jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices, and
that Pennsylvania, through its courts, could not decide the same
controversy and grant its own form of relief.
Several conclusions may be drawn from these cases.
Union Security. Although union ship agreements are per-
mitted under federal law, the NLRA does not authorize any union
security agreements where state laws prohibit or regulate them.
Representation Cases. The states may not deal with questions
of representation in industries over which the NLRB has consist-
ently exercised jurisdiction. Presumably, the states may take
jurisdiction in cases where it is an established NLRB policy to
decline to adjudicate.
Concerted Activities and Unfair Labor Practices. Employee
activities which are affirmatively protected as "concerted activi-
ties" by the NLRA, Section 7, may not be regulated by the states.
Employer-employee activities which fall within the unfair labor
practices set out by the NLRA, Section 8, also may not be regulated
by the states. However, where affirmative protection of the activ-
ity is absent, the field which Congress will be deemed to have
"pre-empted" by Section 7 and 8 of the NLRA will be limited to
the matters with which the Act is expressly concerned.
4 0
State Court Decisions
When a union or employer files a petition with the NLRB, the
Board will initially decide whether or not it has jurisdiction to
resolve the controversy by resorting to the Act. When a union
or employer files a petition with the State Labor Board, the State
Board will, in theory, look to its own labor acts and also the
NLRA to determine whether it has jurisdiction. When the State
Board wishes an injunction to be issued it must turn to the state
courts. At this. time the state court should determine whether the
Board has jurisdiction over the matter. (In Colorado, it is not
necessary that the union or employer go to the State Industrial
Commission; it may go directly to the court.)
"Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL),
74 S. Ct. 161, 22 L.W. 4055 (1953').
40Prentice-Hall, "NLRA," 1954, pp. 4168-4169.
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Although state boards and courts should look to the NL
RA in order to determine local jurisdiction, more often than
not this is not done.
41
Often it is very difficult to decide the question of jurisdiction.
Without a doubt, the state courts have jurisdiction over torts or
crimes. However, criminal or tort punishment is remedial and
an injunction against the commission of the same does not, neces-
sarily, fall within the state police powers. It would seem that if the
pre-emption and conflict doctrine is to be applied, the state court
should not enjoin a crime or tort about to be committed if such
crime or tort is within the prohibition of the National Act. Once
violent picketing or assault upon an individual or employer has
ensued, action for damages would lie. However, state courts often
prohibit such conduct in the interest of preserving the peace.
In the past it has been the practice of the NLRB not to appear
in state court litigations. When cases involving issues of conflict
and pre-emption reach the Supreme Court, the NLRB, with ap-
proval of the Solicitor General, has appeared as amicus curiae.
In view of the budgetary and administrative considerations with
which-the Board is faced, it would neither be practical nor wise
for the Board to look into every state court case involving issues
of conflict and pre-emption. The Board's budget and heavy work-
load does not permit it to assign such work to the staff. There-
fore the opportunity and responsibility for effectuating Congress-
ional policy, in so far as the "pre-emption and conflict" matters
are concerned, depends to a great extent upon local administra-
tive and judicial agencies.
CONCLUSION
Although Federal jurisdiction is limited to interstate and
foreign commerce, Congress has, in addition, jurisdiction over
any business "affecting" commerce. This judisdiction is derived
from the Necessary and Proper Clause which permits federal
regulation of any activity which prohibits, promotes, or affects
interstate commerce.
The Power of the NLRB has extended into local communities
to such an extent that frequently little jurisdiction appears to be
left to the agencies set up by the state acts. Although subject to
the civil, equitable and criminal provisions of the Act, local busi-
nesses are often deprived of access to the NLRB due to budgetary
and administrative consideration or the narrow construction of
Section 10 (a) of the Act. The jurisdictional "yardsticks" have
aided in narrowing the field over which Congress may exercise its
jurisdiction; however, these are subject to alteration, deletion,
or changes by the Board when it deems it expedient.
" See for example, Central Storage and Transfer Co .v. Teamsters, 30 LLRM
2379, 21 Labor Cases, 67,034, 67,035; Montgomery Building and Construc-
tion Trade Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 29 LLRM 2415, 57 So. (2nd) 112;
Goodwin, Inc. v. Hogehorn, 303 N. Y. 300, 101 N. E. (2nd) 697; Art Steel Co. v.
Velazquez, 21 Labor Cases, 66,728, 29 LLRM 2329.
July, 1954 DICTA 265
July, 1954
The NLRB can agree to cede jurisdiction over certain indus-
tries to state agencies, but the NLRB can not cede jurisdiction over
mining, manufacturing, communications or transportation unless
these industries are predominantly local in character. Further-
more, state laws governing the industry in question, must not be
inconsistent with corresponding provisions of the Federal Act.
The pre-emption doctrine has restricted the conflict between
the NLRA and state laws with respect to such fields as unfair labor
practices, certification and union security contracts. However,
recent state cases in which injunctive relief against various types
of concerted activity has been granted do not contain considera-
tion of the fact that the enjoined conduct falls within the pre-
empted field. This seems particularly true where state courts have
granted injunctive relief to private parties against secondary boy-
cotts and where stranger picketing and organizational strikes
have been enjoined on the ground that the objective of the con-
certed activity is unlawful under either the State or Federal law.
If easy evasion of the Supreme Court's pre-emption
policy is to be avoided, state regulation, which in fact
duplicates, or complements the protection afforded under
the Federal Act, can not be permitted to stand and if
application of the state law forfeits the rights guaranteed
by the National Act or obstructs effectuation of National
policy, the state law can not be given effect.
If the pre-emption policy is given effect in the spirit
of the Supremacy Clause, it will, as Congress intended it
should, aid in reducing Federal-State jurisdictional con-
flicts, and point the way to desirable improvements in
federal law in the field of labor management relations.42
4 M. G. Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
LABOR LAW JOURNAL (1952), Vol. 3, No. 11, p. 815.
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